Incentives when Environment and Unobservable Managerial Effort Complement

Authors

  • Krishnamurthy FACULTY Author

Keywords:

Agency Theory, Quality, Incentives

Abstract

This paper presents a simple model showing the incentive payments to a manager when his efforts are unobservable and the efforts and the environment act in a complementary fashion. Using the example of manufacturing quality, we show that 1) incentive payments increase with increase in cost of quality and 2) managerial effort at quality increases with incentive payments.

Author Biography

  • Krishnamurthy , FACULTY

    School of Accounting
    Florida International University
    Miami, FL 33199

Downloads

Published

2016-02-29

How to Cite

Incentives when Environment and Unobservable Managerial Effort Complement. (2016). International Academic Research Journal of Business and Management, 4(5), 15-19. https://www.acrpub.com/index.php/iarjbm/article/view/184

Similar Articles

1-10 of 26

You may also start an advanced similarity search for this article.