Incentives when Environment and Unobservable Managerial Effort Complement
Keywords:
Agency Theory, Quality, IncentivesAbstract
This paper presents a simple model showing the incentive payments to a manager when his efforts are unobservable and the efforts and the environment act in a complementary fashion. Using the example of manufacturing quality, we show that 1) incentive payments increase with increase in cost of quality and 2) managerial effort at quality increases with incentive payments.
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2016-02-29
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Copyright (c) 2016 Academic Research Publishers

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
How to Cite
Incentives when Environment and Unobservable Managerial Effort Complement. (2016). International Academic Research Journal of Business and Management, 4(5), 15-19. https://www.acrpub.com/index.php/iarjbm/article/view/184